Hofstra Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1

Article 5

1980

The Interaction of Federal Deregulation and State
Regulation
Eli M. Noam

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Recommended Citation
Noam, Eli M. (1980) "The Interaction of Federal Deregulation and State Regulation," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss1/5

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Noam: The Interaction of Federal Deregulation and State Regulation

THE INTERACTION OF FEDERAL
DEREGULATION AND STATE REGULATION
Eli M. Noam*
The past few years have witnessed federal deregulation in key3
2
industries. First it reached stock brokers,' railroads, and airlines;7
6
5
then communications; 4 and now banking, energy, and trucking.

While each of these deregulations is important by itself, their cumulative effect and the trend that they augur are particularly significant, suggesting a watershed in government-business relations
comparable to the New Deal, even if lacking its drama. For the
first time in memory, excluding post-war demobilizations, the federal government's direct role in the economy is being reduced on a

broad front. This development, one would expect, must affect all
actors in a federal nation, including the states. Whereas for several
decades the states have played only a supporting role in the

regulatory field, being eclipsed by the aspirations of federal government, they now experience new opportunities and perceive

unmet needs in the wake of increasing federal withdrawal from
regulation. One can thus predict that changes in state regulation

are about to occur.
An analysis of this potential development leads to the conclusion that if the primary goal of deregulation is the reduction of gov* Associate Professor of Business and Lecturer in Law, Columbia University.
A.B., 1970; A.M., 1972; Ph.D., J.D., 1975, Harvard University. The author wishes to
acknowledge the generous research support of the R. Grace Foundation and the help
extended by Richard D. Friedman, Allan B. Taylor, and, especially, Nadine Strossen.
1. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(amending various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-210, Titles I & II, 90 Stat. 31 (amending various sections of 45 U.S.C. & 49

U.S.C.).
3. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(amending various sections of 49 U.S.C.).
4. See In re Regulation of Domestic Receive-only Satellite Earth Stations, 74
F.C.C.2d 205 (1979) (deregulating satellite domestic communications); In re Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979).
5. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (amending various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
6. 10 C.F.R. §§ 210.35, 212.56-.62 (1980).
7. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (amending 49
U.S.C. Subtitle IV).
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emnment interference in business decisions, deregulation may in
many cases be counterproductive and actually create more government regulation. It is therefore the contention of this paper that for
certain federal deregulations the resulting state regulation will
more than offset the reduced federal activity. If true, this finding
should give pause to ardent deregulators.
DEREGULATION VS. DECENTRALIZATION

As a starting point, it is necessary to distinguish the concepts
of deregulation and decentralization. To most observers these two
appear identical: the termination of a federal regulatory activity is
believed to be a reduction both of regulation and of the powers of
the federal government. But while the second of these reductions
may occur when the activities of a federal agency are curbed, one
cannot necessarily assume a reduction of total government interference-the potential of state or local regulation remains. In the
face of strong federal activity, states may have chosen to avoid duplication, or more likely were precluded by federal preemption. 8
Yet where federal regulation is abolished, state activity is likely to
emerge.
The problem, far from hypothetical, is already upon us, having
reached the courts in two recent cases. Both Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Dubno9 and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully' 0 are challenges by major oil
companies to statutes enacted in 1980 by the states of Connecticut" and New York' 2 which allegedly impose price controls
on oil products after their deregulation on the federal level. In
both cases the district courts held against the states;' 3 both were
dismissed on appeal on jurisdictional grounds.' 4 The immediate
issue in these cases involves only a relatively minor aspect of a
8. For a discussion of preemption, see Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the
Concept of Preemption, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 630 (1972).
9. 492 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Conn. 1980), dismissed in relevant part, No. 80-7677

(2d Cir. Jan. 28, 1981).
10. 80-CV-543 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1980), dismissed in relevant part, No.
80-7785 (2d Cir. Jan. 28, 1981).
11. Act of April 11, 1980, No. 653, 1980 Conn. Pub. Acts 124 (to be codified in
scattered sections of titles 12 & 14 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.).
12. Ch. 271, § 3 and ch. 272, § 2, 1980 N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. TAX LAW §
182 (McKinney's Supp. 1980)).
13. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dubno, 492 F. Supp. at 1012; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully,

80-CV-543, slip op. at 13-17.
14. The Second Circuit held, as to the preemption issue, that the cases were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, because they dealt with questions arising under the Economic Stabilization Act. Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Tully, No. 80-7785, slip op. at 4-8 (2d Cir. Jan. 28, 1981).
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revenue measure-the prohibition against passing on a new tax to
consumers in the form of higher prices. This restriction is
economically irrelevant 15 and, one suspects, based more on
public-relations practice than on public-finance theory. But the
principle at stake in these cases, that of state entry into a regulatory field hitherto occupied by the federal government is of great
importance.
Both Connecticut and New York had imposed a two-percent
tax on the gross receipts of integrated oil companies from their
sales within the states. 16 This, by itself, would not be exceptional
were it not for additional provisions prohibiting the pass-through of
these taxes by the oil companies. Connecticut attempts to spread
the cost of its new tax to its neighboring states by forbidding any
company to raise its wholesale prices in the state by an amount
higher than the average amount by which it raises such prices "in
all ports on the eastern coast of the United States."' 7 New York,
more neighborly but less realistic, prohibits oil companies entirely
from raising their sale prices in response to the tax and requires
18
them to certify annually, under oath, that they have not done so.
The district courts found these provisions to be price regulations
and believed it to be federal policy that most petroleum products
should be free from price regulation. They concluded that state
regulations in conflict with this goal are preempted under the supremacy clause.19
Federal price regulation had been authorized in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 197320 but amendments of
EPAA in 197521 gave the President the power, subject to congressional approval, to exempt petroleum products from such regulation. In early 1980 this exemption was granted to several prod15. The irrelevance of the restriction holds because a state tax that may not be
passed on to consumers will make it less profitable for an oil company to sell in such
a state. Hence, supplies will become smaller in such a state while they become
larger in states without a tax. Relative scarcity then drives prices higher in the tax
states, just as official passing-on of the tax would have. One could not expect prices
to behave other than toward equalization of marginal profits of shipments into each
state.
16. Act of April 11, 1980, No. 653, 1980 Conn. Pub. Acts 124 § 1 (to be codified
in scattered sections of titles 12 & 14 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.); Ch. 271, § 3, 1980
N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. TAx LAw § 182(12)(a) (McKinney's Supp. 1980)).
17. Act of April 11, 1980, No. 653, 1980 Conn. Pub. Acts 124 § 13(b) (to be
codified in scattered sections of titles 12 & 14 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.).
18. Ch. 271, § 3, 1980 N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. TAx LAW § 182(12)(a)
(McKinney's Supp. 1980)).
19. 492 F. Supp. at 1013-15; 80-CV-543, slip op. at 13-17.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-799.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 760(a).
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ucts2 2 that were later the focus of state statutes. 23 The question

whether the EPAA exemptions constitute an affirmative federal
policy excluding states from all action that could be interpreted as
price regulation is hotly disputed at present. It is partly a question

of fact: Did the federal government determine that as a matter of
national policy prices of petroleum products should not be regulated? Primarily, however, it is a question of principle: Does federal nonregulation in an area that it previously regulated constitute
a preemption of that area?24 The latter is an important question.

While there have always been conflicts between state and federal
regulations before the courts, 25 this is the first time that federal
nonregulation has been held to preempt state law. 26 Under the
courts' holdings each area of regulation that the federal government
had occupied is potentially lost forever to the states, even if the
federal regulation had existed for only a short period, as in the

Mobil Oil cases. Therefore, even when the federal government
pursues a policy of deregulation, the federal system may remain

centralized. As the federal powers remain intact, though temporarily quiescent, states are still powerless to act on their own.
THE REGULATORY MODEL

As the Connecticut and New York cases suggest, federal and
state regulation are both in flux; it is therefore important to investi22. The presidential authority was delegated by statute to the Federal Energy
Administration and its successor agency, the Department of Energy. See 15 U.S.C. §
754(b); Executive Order 11790, 39 Fed. Reg. 23185 (1974), as amended by Executive
Order 12038, 43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (1978). The exemptions were granted pursuant to 10
C.F.R. §§ 210.35, 212.56-.62.
23. E.g., Act of April 11, 1980, No. 653, 1980 Conn. Pub. Acts 124 (to be
codified in scattered sections of titles 12 & 14 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.); Ch. 271, § 3
and ch. 272, § 2, 1980 N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. TAX. LAw § 182 (MeKinney's
Supp. 1980)).
24. The district courts in Dubno and Tully were primarily concerned with the
initial question, the intent of Congress, having concluded that precedent established
purposeful federal inaction as equivalent to purposeful federal action. See 492 F.
Supp. at 1006-13; No. 80-CV-543, slip op. at 15-16. The reliance on precedent to answer the latter, more important question, however, does not reach the significant policy questions posed by the conflict between federal deregulation and state regulation. See pages 208-10 infra.
25. E.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracher, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (1980);
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); De Canas
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
26. See sources cited note 8 supra.
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gate their interrelation in order to understand the future of
regulatory power. To do so systematically requires a model that

permits an analysis of regulation. To understand its need and
introduce its methodology, the first question to be raised is why
some regulating activities are lodged in the federal level of government while others are left on different levels. What, for example,
27
is the inherent logic in corporations being regulated by the states
and agriculture by the federal government? 28 The traditional an-

swer to this question is legal-historical in nature;2 9 the federal government, in this view, has certain powers allocated to it. These
powers have expanded over time as the constitutional mandate and
its interpretation by the courts has broadened.3 0 Local and regional

governments, at the lower end of the hierarchy, derive their
regulatory powers from the states whose creature they are. The remaining powers are left with the states.3 1 The problem with this

interpretation of regulatory responsibility is that it is purely descriptive; one learns how basic decisions on the role of govern-

ments came about, but not why they did so.
If the first explanation is associated with law, the second
type is that of conventional economics; implicit in this view is the

belief that the regulatory level is determined by "objective" factors
such as efficiency. The economic approach attempts to show that

different forms of regulation are handled with different efficiencies.3 2 This normative suggestion is helpful, first, because there are
27. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666-68, 701 (1974).

28. E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-213, § 3, 94 Stat.
119 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1445(b)).
29. See E. CoRwIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE (1951).
30. A prime example of this expansion is the federal commerce power, derived
from the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (federal licensing statute prevailed over exclusive right to
engage in steamboat navigation granted by New York); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding federal regulation of intrastate activities
manifesting "a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce"); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding prohibition of interstate shipment of goods
made in violation of federal wage and hour restrictions); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) (small scale intrastate farming operations may be federally regulated
if their impact is significant when viewed in conjunction with other small scale operations). But cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (federal commerce power is qualified by the Bill of Rights).
31. U.S. Const. amend. X.
32. See Fisch, Optimal City Size, the Economic Theory of Clubs, and Exclusionanj Zoning, 73 PUB. CHOICE 59 (1973); McGuire, Group Segregation and
Optimal Jurisdictions, 73 J. POL. ECON. 112 (1973). For a thorough examination of
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efficiencies of scale in regulation, just as in the provision of any
good or service. For example, it is inefficient to have a complex issue, such as insurance regulation, governed by each small town;
yet the other extreme, one large federal insurance agency, may be too
cumbersome and inflexible. Somewhere between these extremes,
at the low point of a U-shaped cost curve, is the optimal size, and
hence the optimal level, of jurisdiction. The second normative justification for regulation suggested by the economic approach concerns the existence of externalities, or spill-over effects. 3 3 It is inefficient to let the policy of a regulating agency have significant
effects outside the area of its jurisdiction because the agency will
not necessarily take the spill-over costs into account. For example,
local regulation of the water quality of a river may permit pollution
which harms the downstream communities. The optimal level of
regulation is therefore the one that captures the externalities of the
regulatory activity. The problem with the economic approach is
that while it adds to theoretical insight it fails to explain the mechanism that connects abstractly efficient levels of government and
their actual endowment with regulatory functions. Arguably, inefficient choices of regulatory level abound, for example, in the
fractionalized jurisdictions of metropolitan areas, 34 or in the setting
of welfare rules on the state, as opposed to the federal, level. 35 Yet
the economic view does not provide an explanation for such
inefficiencies.
A third approach, and the one used in this paper, is the public
choice methodology. Public choice theory is, loosely speaking, the
application of economic techniques to political questions such
as governmental decision processes. 3 6 Applied to the question of
regulation, a public choice model would enable examination of
the preferences for regulation by affected interest groups, of gov-

the value in applying efficiency-related concerns to legal problems, see Symposium
on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980).

33. For a discussion of externalities in various legal situations, see Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv L. REV. 1089 (1972).
34. In many metropolitan areas, the city government and various county gov-

ernments have conflicting jurisdiction regarding local services and many governmental functions are fragmented among numerous small jurisdictions.

35. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law, ch. 55 (McKinney's 1976 & Supp. 1980).
36. For a survey, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). The applicability of
public choice theory to various legal problems is examined in the Symposium on the
Implications of Social Choice Theory for Legal Decisionmaking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
(forthcoming, 1981).
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ernmental action, and of the interaction between different jurisdictions.
Let us assume a country composed of two states, NY and CT.
In each state we have two interest groups, B and S; one could
think, for example, of buyers and sellers of petroleum products as
the interest groups. We also have a type of regulation which can
be set by the regulatory agency of each state at different levels of
strictness, R. It is the characteristic of the two interest groups that
B receives positive benefits from increasing regulation R, while the
opposite is the case for S. Not surprisingly, the former group favors
regulation while the latter opposes it. Both interest groups are also

affected by the regulation in force in the other state. For example,
a price regulation in state CT affects both the energy price to buyers in state NY as well as the profits of NY's sellers. These assumptions can be summarized by equations that express the aggregate
benefits for NY's two interest groups, B and S. Total group benefits
U are the product of individual benefits b i times group size Ni:
(1)

UB= bB

(2) Us =bs

NB =aRYRcT

Ns = yR

NB

T .Ns

,3 and 5 are the elasticities of benefits3 7 to group members with respect to the state's own strictness of regulation, and 0 and * are
those with respect to the other state's regulation. a and y represent the effects of many other factors which, however, are assumed
in this model to be given and not variable.
The other actor in the model is the regulating agency itself It
is assumed that its decisions are determined by the desire to
maximize the political support given to it; this assumption conforms
to those made in the literature by, among others, Niskanen 3 8 and
Stigler.3 9 Support is granted to the regulating agency by each interest group according to its stake in regulation, i.e., the total benefits that it receives from the regulatory policy. When the group's
benefits from regulation are high, the support that is given is
strong. In order to take account of political influence, this support,
moreover, is weighted by the relative importance of each group,
37. The elasticity of benefits referred to here represents the extent to which,
for example, buyers will profit from controlled prices or business practices resulting
from greater regulation. For a general introduction to the concept of elasticity, see E.
MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 159-66, 170 (2d ed. 1977).
38. E.g., Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617 (1975).
39. E.g., Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. So. 359 (1974).
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the measure of which is expressed by the rate of the sizes of each
NB

group,

The support function, F, for the regulating agency is

hence:

(3

1'T

(3) F=FB+Fs=UB

NB

Nss +

US

NB

Nss

Into this equation the expressions for the benefits (1B and [Is can
be substituted from equations (1) and (2), making agency support a
function of the regulation, RNY, that is chosen by the agency. The
regulating agency can vary the support that is given to it by choosing different regulatory strictnesses. For the agency, the optimal
strictness is where support is maximized. The optimal regulatory
strictness, R* can be found, after taking the derivative of (3)40 and
solving for RNy, as:
-- / 78
N 3 \---gRc
!
(4) R~y=

(

t

RCT

This expression shows the optimizing regulation for the agency as
dependent on the sensitivities of the interest group within state
NY to its own regulations (,8 and 5), on the relative size of the
groups

NB)

and on the sensitivities to the other state's regulation,

RCT(k and qn). For the second state CT we assume similar relations

to hold; the same two interest groups B and S exist, with the same
individual benefit functions but with different group sizes MB and
Ms. State CT's optimizing
regulation will be analogous to equation
(4), thus, RcT = ay ( s , y)
MB 'B')

Thus each state's optimal regulation is, in part, dependent on
the other state's regulation. One can illustrate this in Graph 1 with
functions of the optimal regulation for the two states. For example,
state CT, reacting to NY's initial regulation R y, chooses to have
RCT. State NY thereupon chooses R" which prompts R"T, and so
on. This mutual adjustment process leads either to an equilibrium
40. In taking the derivative of equation (3), one would arrive at the regulating
agency's increment in support, given the utility functions of both the buyers' interest
group and the sellers' interest group.
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RCT

R*-r

RCT
RCT

RC'T

-- - -- -

RCT

GRAPH I

in point P, or to extreme points without equilibrim. The latter situation prevails if CT's reaction function is steeper than NY's (which
occurs when the absolute difference between the own-regulation
elasticities, 63-, is smaller than that of the cross-elasticities,
q)-j).

4

1

This can be observed if we interchange the two curves in

Graph 1. An initial regulation of R y is now reacted to by CT's
choosing of R'c, which in turn causes R'y, etc. These increasing
cuts in regulation can occur because states compete with each
other and relinquish regulatory strictness. This process, in the case
of corporation law, has been aptly termed by Cary as a "race to
the bottom. 42 The opposite extreme, a "race to the top," may also

41. That is, because one interest group would gain substantially

greater relative

benefit from the other state's regulation, the home state would be forced to choose
an alternative strictness of regulation which is sufficiently different to require the
other state to modify its regulation significantly in order to maximize support.
42. Cary, supra note 27, at 666.
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be reached as the states drive each other into ever-increasing
strictness. This can happen when states strive to keep undesirable
activities, for example the disposal of radioactive waste, out of their
jurisdiction, and issue increasingly stringent regulations.
In those cases where a stable equilibrium is reached, it is at
the point of intersection PI of the two reaction functions. Some
tedious algebra reveals this point to lie, for state NY, at:

(5)

RNY

N1

2P)~\B)

An analogous result is found for state CT. This, then, is the equilibrium for regulation in a situation where both states are free to
set their standards of regulatory strictness.
Suppose, however, that the reactions of both states are such
that no equilibrium is reached, but rather a "race to the bottom"
takes place to the detriment of both states. As mentioned, the condition for an equilibrium is fl-8 < 4-tP. Quite frequently this stability condition will not be met. In this situation two remedies are
possible: first, a "cartel" or horizontal agreement among states, for
example in the form of uniform laws, adopted by all or most of the
states. However, just as in the case of private cartel agreements,
uniform laws are cumbersome to agree upon since each state holds
some veto power if substantial uniformity is sought; and even when
uniform laws are agreed upon, the temptation to reap benefits by
breaching them is irresistible. This indeed has happened to most
uniform acts at their adoption by state legislation or in subsequent interpretation by courts.4 3 The second alternative in a situation of
disequilibrium is the creation of an entity entrusted to set rules for
all, similar in its function to a business trust or a holding company.
This authority is the federal government. Such a limited view of
federalism prevailed during the early years of the American Constitution." The drafting of this view was, in part, prompted by the
43. See Hintz, DisparateJudicial Construction of the UCC-The Need for Federal Legislation, 22 UTAH L. REV. 722 (1969); Robertson, Federal Regulation of
Banking: A Plea for Unification, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 673 (1966); Schnader,
Why the Commercial Code Should be 'Uniform,' 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237

(1963).
44. See E.
(1965).

BAUE,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 1798-1860,
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competition between states under the Articles of Confederation.
(Southern states held the holding-company view when they seceded; as far as they were concerned they sold their shares in the
American enterprise when they disliked management).
In terms of Graph 1, a federal government could prevent the
complete deterioration of regulation by its setting and enforcement
of a rule at some level of strictness, for example at P2. Where P2
will lie depends on the interplay of interest groups on the federal
level. An unstable situation such as a "race to the bottom" makes
for a convincing case in support of federal regulation. Yet it should
be noted that in most areas of federal regulation one would not intuitively expect a disequilibrium to develop if, instead, states were
to assume regulation. Why then federal regulation? An alternative
explanation for the federal presence must be sought. To discuss
this the model is consequently expanded. Let us assume that regulation is now lodged at the federal level. We have again two interest groups with a national regulatory agency that seeks to maximize
support. The two interest groups, B and S, exist nationwide; their
national size is the sum of their state sizes (i.e., of NB+MB and
Ns+Ms). Because nationwide regulation is in force there are no
separate state standards, RNy and RCT, but instead a common
standard, Rus. Therefore, for an interest group such as B the benefits from regulation are expressed as:
(6)

UB = bB " (NB + MB) = aRU'(NB + MB)

An analogous relation holds for group S. The point of maximum
support for the federal regulatory agency can then be found, after
some calculus and algebra, at:
1

y(8+,)
Ks

+Ms~f

&7NB+M

B!]

This is the expected strictness of regulation on the federal level.
The important question now is which of the two levels of government, federal or state, is stricter in its regulation? The underlying assumption of federal deregulation is, after all, that it reduces
regulation. There is no general answer to this question, since the
solution depends on the size and direction of the parameters. But
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certainly federal regulation is not necessarily stricter; one can demonstrate that in the model, under quite reasonable conditions, state
regulation is the stricter of the two. To show this, let us assume
that the proregulation group B is stronger than the antiregulation
Ns Ms
group S in both state NY and in state CT, i.e., N- MB < 1. Let
us further assume that the sensitivity of group S to its own state's
regulation is stronger than that of group B, and that state regulation would result in an equilibrium point of the type P, in the
graph rather than at the unstable extreme points. This, as mentioned, means that the difference of cross-elasticities is larger than
that of their own-elasticities, i.e., that 0- > /3-8.45 This stability
condition exists, for example, if both interest groups in a state receive positive externalities, 4)and ji, that are not too low. In fact,
all it takes is for one state group to be substantially and positively
affected by the other's regulation, while the other's cross-elasticities are of moderate value; their sign then becomes immaterial.
Alternatively, the stability condition is met when the antiregulation
group is strongly affected by changes in its own state's regulation, while the other group's sensitivity is of moderate size.
When these conditions, 46 none of which is very exceptional,
are met, the state regulation for the state NY that will emerge from
the interaction of the two states is higher than federal regulation
has been, i.e.:
RNY > Rus and RcT > RUs

The conclusion therefore is that, generally speaking, state regulation will be more strict than federal regulation if (1) one interest
group experiences substantial positive spill-over effects from the
regulation in another state, or (2) all interest groups experience at
least some positive spill-overs, or (3) the antiregulation group is
particularly sensitive to changes in its own state's regulation.
It is helpful to refer again to Graph 1. Contrasted with state
45.

See note 41 supra.

46. An additional algebraic equation provides that:
Ns+Ms
a/3
NB+M,

-

y

8

This will usually be the case if group S is more sensitive to regulation than is group
B, since y is negative and the other quantities are positive.
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regulation, federal rules are stricter when federal regulation is at a
point like P3 on the graph and P, is the state regulatory equilibrium. On the other hand, if the federal regulation had been at P2,
state regulation will actually be higher. Or, where federal regulation is at P3 and its removal triggers a "race to the top" in state
regulation, a federal ceiling is lower than the decentralized outcome. The common assumption of federal deregulation is the P3
situation. As we have seen, however, this is only one of several
possibilities. It may be objected that federal regulation would not
be abolished in the first place if it is likely to result in stricter state
regulation since to do so would be counterproductive. Yet for this
objection to be true one must presuppose a political-decision process of considerable foresight. When the abolition of federal regulation is sought there may be no state regulations in existence. Yet
once federal regulation is abolished the interest group pressures
generate regulation in some states and the other states then adjust
their regulation to it.
It is interesting to speculate what sets this process in motion.
One explanation is that a previously existing point of equilibrium
that determined federal regulation has been disturbed by a shift in
the relative influence of the interest groups. But it is also possible
that no shift in interest-group powers has occurred; instead a slow
and cyclical process of oscillation between federal and state regulation may exist even in the absence of such regulation. These cycles
are based on quite stable preference within the body politic for the
regulatory strictness. The level of government that will be vested
with regulatory authority is the one whose regulatory strictness
most resembles the preferences of the body politic. This choice
would be different at different times because the states' regulaulation, and hence attractiveness, changes. For example, state regulation may be, at an initial point P, too high relative to expected
national regulation P?, given the prevailing influence of interest
groups B and S. The result is a decision for national regulation
which eliminates most state regulation by federal preemption. At
that point national regulation may become unfavorably high in
comparison to the state alternative; hence federal deregulation occurs. But now the states' regulation increases and their strictness
moves toward equilibrium in P1. From there the cycle can start
anew. 47
47.

For a discussion of the cycle in the regulation of banking, see Redford,
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APPLYING THE MODEL

We can now apply the model to the Dubno and Tully cases.
Federal regulation of the prices of petroleum products had been
abolished, largely because the influence of the antiregulation
group, S,was very strong on the national level. On the state level,
however, the power balance between S and B did not result in
R=0. Both New York and Connecticut thus impose some regulation, RNY and RcT, conforming to equation (4). These regulations
have externalities on the neighboring state, and judging from the
proximity in the adoption of the statutes, the regulators are aware
of these effects. In the case of Connecticut the externality is actually written into the law; as Judge Blumenfeld found, the cost of
Connecticut's tax "may be recouped only on a pro-rata basis from
all customers in the states (including Connecticut) to which petroleum products are distributed from east coast ports." 4 8 Hence, in
terms of the model, the cross-elasticity 40 is negative. tP,
the crosselasticity for group S, is assumed to be negative with respect to the
other state's regulation; this can be expected because as CT becomes a less profitable place for oil companies, they will move
some of their operations and efforts into the more promising state
NY, thereby increasing competition in that state and reducing
proflt margins. Because the benefit function is negative, a negative
cross-elasticity means that 'p is positive. The quantity 4- ' is
therefore a negative minus a positive, which is positive when the
cross-elasticity of the interest group S is higher than that of B.
Since the sellers of oil products can be expected to be more sensitive to price changes than will consumers, it is reasonable to conclude that this is indeed the case. Turning to the elasticities 3 and
a, we can assume that the elasticity of buyers to regulation is positive but moderate in size, while that of oil companies is negative
and large, again because they are strongly affected. Given the negative form of the benefit function for S,its elasticity 8 is then positive and large. The quantity 3-5 therefore has a negative sign.
The comparison of )3-8 with 4)-'P is, it will be recalled, the
equilibrium test for state regulation. It is met if the latter quantity
is larger than the former. We have found that 3-8 is negative,
while 4)- 'P is positive. Hence the condition for a stable equilibDual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 749 (1966);
Scott, Economic Theory of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
48. 492 F. Supp. at 1010.
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rium is fulfilled. The conclusion is therefore that one need not be
alarmed about the challenged state regulation in the belief that
the two states will escalate their taxes indefinitely as they shift its
consequences to their neighbors. There will be some stable equilibrium; but where will it lie? The first condition for state equilibrium
to be greater than federal regulation is, from before, N, M-§<,
i.e., that proregulators are in the majority in both states. Judging from the fact that anti-oil-company laws were passed in New
York and Connecticut, this may be inferred. The second condition
is that of stability, i.e., 0k- > /3-8, which was shown already49
to hold. The third condition requires a greater sensitivity of sellers to regulate, 1 1 > I I,which was also assumed above 5 ° to be
a/.
Ns+Ms
true. The final algebraic condition is that N B+M B >

We know

from before that 8 > /3, and we can also presume that the size of
S's benefit function is larger than B's, i.e., y > a Hence,

5

is

< 1. When the benefits of S (parameters y and 8) are sufficiently
more sensitive than those of B (parameters a and /3), the last condition is also fulfilled. Hence, the model predicts that at the end of
the adjustment process both states will have regulation that is
stricter than the previous federal rules.
The exclusion of states from regulation is indeed crucial if
one wishes to avoid this result. The attempt at expansion of the
preemption doctrine, as sought in Dubno and Tully, is thus a predictable defensive response by the federal government and its allies in energy policy. It is, however, a losing battle. Even in these
cases, the courts would probably have let the statutes stand had
they been drafted differently. 51 The authority of states to pass their
own revenue measures was reaffirmed rather than disputed. If the
prevention of a pass-through was the states' goal, a similar result
could have been obtained by a levelling of the tax on petroleum
products that are particularly price-elastic and therefore more immune to a pass-through.
Other methods to circumvent preemption will, no doubt, be
proposed by enterprising legislators. The federal government,
49.
50.
51.

See p. 204 supra.
See p. 206 supra.
See 492 F. Supp. at 1010-12; 80-CV-543, slip op. at 34-37.
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equally predictably, will press for ever-wider interpretation of its
power to preempt states in order to plug the ever-new loopholes.
If these attempts are successful, the end result will be more centralized federal power against state activity. If they are not, the
outcome, in some areas, will be state rules more strict than the
previous federal regulations. Such choice between regulation and
centralization is not necessarily a pleasant one, and one whose
tradeoffs ought to be considered by advocates of deregulation.
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